

Solution to HW #12, EE 578/CS 578, Fall 2000

(1)

Alice's public key: $b_A = 2^3 = 8$

Bob's " " " : $b_B = 2^5 = 32$

"Oscar's PK" : $b_O = 2^{16} = 156 \pmod{467}$

Alice comp. $K_{AO} = b_O^3 \equiv 173 \pmod{467}$

Oscar comp. $K_{AO} = b_A^{16} = 8^{16} \equiv 173$ "

Bob comp. $K_{BO} = b_O^5 = 156^5 \equiv 123$ "


Oscar comp. $K_{BO} = b_B^{16} = 32^{16} \equiv 123$ "

(2) a) Certificate will have Oscar's ID rather than Bob's
 \Rightarrow Alice will detect this directly

b) Certificate will not verify

(3) Oscar

$$b_O = \alpha^{a_O} \pmod{p}$$



CA


CA thinks it's Alice

$$C(A) = (\text{ID}(A), b_O, \text{sig}_{EA}(\text{ID}(A), b_O))$$

O-H: Oscar

Bob

$$\text{ver}_{CA}(C(A)) = \text{true}$$




$$\text{ver}_{CA}(C(A)) = \text{true}$$


$$K_{BO} = b_B^{a_O} = \alpha^{a_B a_O} \pmod{p}$$

$$K_{BO} = b_O^{a_B} = \alpha^{a_B a_O} \pmod{p}$$

④ Certificate request:




Here it happens: Alice will compare her PK with the one in the certificate and see that it is forged. Note that Oscar can not manipulate the certificate itself in 3)



b) Oscar

generate faked certificate: $b_O = \alpha^{a_O}$

$$C(A) = (ID(A), b_O, sig_O(ID(A), b_O))$$



$$k_{BO} = b_B^{a_O} = \alpha^{a_B a_O} \text{ mod } p$$

$$k_{BO} = b_O^{a_B} = \alpha^{a_B a_O} \text{ mod } p$$